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THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL ROLE IN CHILD CUSTODY
DISPUTES: FROM FAULT FINDER TO CONFLICT MANAGER
TO DIFFERENTIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
Andrew Schepard, JD.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary's role in divorce related child custody disputes has
been transformed in the latter half of the twentieth century in response
to the changing characteristics of American families, changing percep-
tions of the needs of children, and an overwhelming case load increase.
The transformation occurred in two distinct phases, and a third is
currently in process.
In Phase I, from the late 1960s (the beginning of widespread "no
fault" divorce) to 1980, the child custody court was a fault finder
functioning through adversary procedure. The court's job was to
identify a single custodial parent and assign that parent primary legal
rights to the child afer a trial about which parent was a better custodian
for the child.
Phase I courts conceived of a custody dispute much like a will
contest. The parents' marriage, like the decedent, was dead. Parents,
like the heirs, were in dispute about the distribution of one of the assets
of the estate-their children. The Phase I court's role was, after trial, to
determine which heir/parent was more morally or psychologically
worthy to control the children. The goal of the proceeding was a one
time determination of custody "rights" which created "stability" for the
future management of the asset. The winner was, however, largely
predetermined by gender biased substantive standards that eliminated
the seeming indeterminancy of the "best interests" test. Once the court
distributed custody rights, its role in facilitating the ongoing process of
reorganizing the child's relationships with both parents was over, except
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for enforcement or modification of its initial award, tasks also accom-
plished through adversary process.
Phase I courts did not survive the advent of mass "no fault divorce,"
the associated increase in disputes about children, the drive against
gender bias in the legal system, and, most significantly, the increasing
evidence that the child's well-being after divorce generally is promoted
by reduced parental conflict and continuing relationships with both.
American society became more tolerant of divorce as a necessary evil
in promoting adult happiness. It also came to recognize, however, that
for children divorce is a process of redefining relationships over a long
period of time-not the death of the family, but an occasion for its
reorganization.
Custody courts responded by redefining themselves as conflict
managers rather than fault finders, Phase II in their late twentieth
century evolution. Courts became the apex of a multi faceted dispute
resolution system that encourages out-of-court agreement on parenting
plans. Court-affiliated education programs, mediation, and legal rules
which reward post divorce and separation cooperation between parents
are the core of a newly created settlement culture, and trials are a last
resort for particularly troublesome cases.
A Phase II custody court can be analogized to a bankruptcy court
supervising the reorganization of a potentially viable business in current
financial distress. The business is raising children and the parents-the
managers of the business-are in conflict about how that task is to be
accomplished. The court's aim is to get the managers to voluntarily
agree on a parenting plan rather than impose one on them. The court
uses education and mediation to facilitate voluntary agreement. The
court ratifies the parties' agreements and only decides issues that the
parents cannot decide themselves. The court has an ongoing role in
managing parental conflict; parents have continuing access to the
settlement processes if future disputes arise or modification of the
parenting plan is necessary because of changed circumstances.
The Phase II managerial court better serves the needs of most
parents and children in divorcing families than its Phase I fault finding
predecessor. The need for transformation of thejudicial role in custody
disputes, however, is not over. Phase III in the continuing evolution of
the judicial role in child custody disputes is for courts to recognize that
not all divorce related custody disputes are the same. High conflict
cases-roughly defined as those involving repeated relitigation, family
violence, child abduction, mental illness, or drug or substance
abuse-require special treatment. The disproportionate judicial
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resources such cases consume create a temptation to include them in the
settlement culture of Phase II. Phase II mediation and education
programs are, however, not tailored to include such families. The
special risks high conflict divorces pose to children and vulnerable
family members make it imperative that they are identified through
careful screening, that existing programs are adopted for them and that
mental health resources are available for such families.
Overall, Phase III custody courts need to establish differential case
management plans (DCM) for high conflict cases. These plans should
develop criteria to "triage" these particularly difficult cases early in their
judicial life cycle without burdening the great percentage of reasonably
cooperative divorcing parents with unduly intrusive state intervention.
Court-affiliated parent education and mediation must be adapted to
account for the risks that high conflict disputes create for physical and
emotional safety of children and parents. Mental health and child
protection systems must be integrated into the DCM plan. DCM plans
also must create an expedited, actively managed dispute resolution plan
for the chaotic and conflicted families involved in high conflict cases to
insure that someone in authority monitors the behavior of parents and
the welfare of their children.
The first part of this article is a condensed history of the evolution
of the judicial role in divorce and custody cases from fault finder to
conflict manager. The second part describes the need for and the
mechanisms of a plan for DCM of high conflict divorce-related custody
disputes. It first summarizes some available data on high conflict
divorces and their effects on children. It then describes a high conflict
family, a composite drawn from actual cases. Finally, the article
identifies several of the core principles that should govern how that
family is treated by the judicial system--court unification, differential
diagnosis, and multiple dispute resolution and treatment options.
II. FROM FAULT FINDER TO CONFLICT MANAGER
Before describing the transformation in the custody court's role
from fault finder to conflict manager and beyond, it is important to note
that it is a transformation of ideas that different states have implemented
with different levels of operational enthusiasm and resource commit-
ments. The transformation is far from complete at an operational level
in the day to day resolution of custody disputes in courthouses through-
out the nation. Rather, as will be seen, California has been at the
forefront of change, and other states like Oregon, Washington, and New
2000] 397
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Jersey are also far along. New York, in contrast, continues to support
a more adversarial child custody dispute resolution system. It does not
mandate mediation of custody disputes,' does not have legislation or
court rules authorizing courts to require attendance at parent education
programs,2 and does not mention the need for a child to have relation-
ships with both parents following divorce in its custody statute.3
It is also important to note that the transformation from fault finder
to conflict manager paralleled a period of great instability in American
family life as reflected in official divorce statistics, court filings, and the
1. The first comprehensive statutory proposal for mediation of child custody
disputes in New York grew out of a study in the 1980s by the New York State Law
Revision Commission for which Professor Linda Silbennan of New York University
Law School and I were co-consultants. See Recommendations of the Law Revision
Commission to the 1985 Legislature Relating to the Child Custody Decision-Making Process,
19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 105 (1985). The Legislature did not enact the proposal
in the face of opposition from the matrimonial bar and womens' lawyers groups. Bills
are regularly introduced to require mediation of child custody disputes in New York,
but so far, none has passed.
2. New York does, of course, have parent education programs, including
P.E.A.C.E. (Parent Education and Custody Effectiveness) of which I am one of the
founders. See Andrew Schepard, War and P. E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary Report and a Model
Statute on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and Separating Parents,
27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 155 (1993) [hereinafter Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.].
Judicial referrals to parent education programs in New York, however, are not presently
authorized by court rules or legislation. New York's Office of Court Administration
has introduced legislation to remedy the situation. See S. 587-B, 222d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1999). Arkansas, in contrast, has recently joined the 44 other states that have
enacted court rules authorizing courts to require parents to attend education programs
as part of the divorce process. See Act of Mar. 18, 1999, No. 704 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-322 (LEXIS Supp. 1999)). See also Debra A. Clement, 1998
Nationwide Survey of the Legal Status of Parent Education, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REV. 219, 221 (1998) (providing a list of the other 44 states).
3. The only specific factor that the court must consider in a child custody dispute
in New York is an allegation of domestic violence. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240.1 (a)
(McKinney 1999). In contrast, Arkansas recently amended its child custody standards
to require the court to consider the child's need for frequent and continuing contact
with both parents and proven allegations of domestic violence in making a custody
order. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (a)-(c) (LEXIS Supp. 1999). See IRA MARK
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 672-73 (3d ed. 1998)
(providing a brief description of and citations to statutes and articles describing the
national trend to joint custody). After comprehensive study, a Special Joint Committee
on Joint Custody and Access of the Canadian Parliament recently proposed that "[tihe
willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing relationship between the child and the other parent" be added as a factor for
courts to consider in their multi-factored child custody analysis, along with "[a]ny
proven history of family violence" perpetrated by an applicant. SPECIAL JOINT
COMMITTEE ON CHILD CUSTODY AND ACCESS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, REPORT: FOR
THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN 45 (1998) [hereinafter CANADIAN PARLIAMENT CUSTODY
REPORT].
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social attitudes toward divorce that lie beneath them. Between 1950 and
1997, the divorce rate in the United States rose from 2.6 per 1,000
people to 4.3 per 1,000 people, with a peak of 5.3 per 1,000 people in
1981." Between 1951 and 1999, the number of children annually
involved in divorce climbed from approximately 6.1 per thousand to
16.8 per thousand5 (which translates to about 1,005,000 per year), a
fundamental change in the way children experience growing up in
American society.6 Almost half of United States first marriages end in
divorce and 65 % of those couples have minor children.7 "Parents with
young children are the fastest growing segment of the divorcing
population, presently constituting the majority of those who are
divorcing in the 1990s."' At least 40% of today's young adult women
are likely to divorce sometime in their lives.9
The increase in divorces affecting children parallels an increase in
court filings arising from changes in family composition. The number
of divorce and custody related disputes filed in state courts has increased
enormously in recent years. According to the National Center for State
Courts, "[d]omestic relations cases are the largest and fastest-growing
segment of state court civil caseloads. In 1995, 25 percent of total civil
filings, over 4.9 million, were domestic relations cases. The total
number of domestic relations cases increased 4.1 percent since 1994 and
70 percent since 1984.""I Divorces registered an 8% increase from 1988
to 1995 while custody cases increased 43% in that same period." It is
also important to note that a large percentage of the increase in custody
cases are disputes between parents who were never married. Even
4. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
VrrALSTATiSTICs 75 (1999). The divorce rate recently declined slightly and is presently
at the lowest annual rate in two decades. This recent decline, however, must be
measured against a 67% increase in the divorce rate between 1970 and 1990.
5. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 240.
6. See Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified
Family Court: A Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 95, 98-100 (1998) [hereinafter
Schepard, Conflict Prevention Programs].
7. See National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control, Advance
Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 & 1990 (visited Mar. 3, 2000)
<http://www.cdc.gov/nchswww/products/pubs/pubd/mvsr/supp/44-43/mvs43_9s.htm>.
8. Marsha Kline Pruett& Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer's Role During the Divorce
Process: Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children and Their Attorneys, 33 FAM. L.Q.
283, 284 (1999).
9. Richard E. Behrman & Linda Sandham Quinn, Children and Divorce: Overview
and Analysis, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE, Spring 1994, at 5.
10. BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEIL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1995: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 39 (1996).
11. See id. at 40.
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though the divorce rate has stabilized in recent years, the number of
custody disputes reaching court has grown, largely because of the
increase in disputes between never married parents. 12 Disputes about
children resulting from divorce and separation are the largest category
of family related filings in the New York court system (child support is
the first with child custody a close second). 3
To me, as will be described, the transformation in the judicial role
from fault finder to conflict manager is based on a policy judgment
shared by legislators and the judiciary that children's best interests
generally are promoted by parental conflict reduction and continuing
relationships with both parents after family reorganization. A more
cynical person might, however, view the transformation as a necessity
for judicial survival-an adaptation to cope with an exponentially
increased workload in a time of limited resources rather than a philo-
sophical shift. The cynic would argue that the court system would break
down if all of the child related divorce cases filed had to be tried and
that judges are happy to delegate responsibility for family matters to
settlement processes because they do not want such cases on their
dockets. It is difficult to convince a cynic that her "realistic" view of
human motivation has no basis. Interviews and discussions with many
judges and family court personnel, however, have convinced me that
most courts have embraced a better vision of children's best interests in
moving from Phase I to Phase II. In any event, the operational result is
the same no matter what the reasons are for it.
A. Phase I: No Fault Divorce and the Sole Custody System
Until the second half of the twentieth century, only virtuous
spouses could get divorces and "[t]he divorce laws of every state
assumed an adversary proceeding between spouses in which the plaintiff
had to prove the defendant's 'fault.," 4 Today, every state has a no-fault
divorce ground. 5 Overall, the philosophical shift to no-fault divorce has
12. See Schepard, Conflict Prevention Programs, supra note 6, at 100.
13. See Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan Lippman, New York State Unified Court System
Family Justice Program, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 144, 145 (1998). The authors
are the Chief Judge and the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts of the State of
New York.
14. ELLMAN ETAL., supra.note 3, at 191.
15. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 201. There are, of course, important
differences between types of no-fault divorce statues. See id. Some states have
eliminated fault grounds entirely and make their sole ground for divorce "irreconcilable
differences," "incompatibility," or some variation thereof. Id. Other states simply add
400 [Vol. 22
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been described by one scholar as a "silent revolution" which took place
without extended public debate or dramatic political controversy. 6
Ironically, the silent revolution began in California in the 1960s as
an effort to preserve marriages and reduce divorce, not to make family
dissolution easier. Liberalized grounds for divorce were, in the
conception of the no-fault divorce revolution's designers, tied to the
creation of an expert family court one of whose goals was to scrupu-
lously examine whether couples did indeed have "irreconcilable
differences" and to reconcile as many couples as possible. 7 Politics and
budgetary limitations, however, intervened, and only one half of the
plan was ever implemented. The family court was never created while
the liberalized grounds for divorce were. In effect, adults gained
freedom to divorce without state scrutiny of their family life. The result
was what my colleague J. Herbie DiFonzo has called the triumph of
"naked divorce.-"no fault divorce on demand"' 8 in many states.
The no-fault divorce revolution was not, however, linked to
changes in thinking about the court's role in the child custody dispute
resolution process. Even after no-fault divorce, custody courts awarded
sole custody to one parent after a highly adversarial trial in contested
cases. Children remained a prize to be won by casting aspersions on the
other spouse in a courtroom. The result was that while fault was de-
emphasized in the grounds for divorce, it remained the dominant criteria
in the custody determinations which resulted from it.
Ostensibly, the substantive standard for custody determinations in
Phase I was the indeterminate "best interests of the child" test. What the
court really did, however, was to determine which of the contestants was
the "better parent" and award all custody rights to her leaving the other
parent legally marginalized with "visitation." The justification for the
sole custody award was to create "stability" for the child and the legal
system by identifying a "primary parent," thus supposedly authorita-
tively ending the possibility of future disputes.
a no-fault ground like living "separate and apart" for a period of time (often relatively
lengthy like 18 months or so) to familiar fault grounds like "adultery" and "cruel or
inhuman treatment." Id. The requirement of a lengthy period of separation or a formal
separation agreement as a condition of no-fault divorce "may be sufficient to persuade
parties to seek divorce on fault grounds instead." Id.
16. See generally HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).
17. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 373-81
(1972).
18. J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATHTHE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGALCULTURE
OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 145, 170 (1997).
2000] 401
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In actual operation, the "tender years" doctrine filled in the
indeterminancy of the "best interests" test in most cases involving
younger children-mother won unless she was unfit. This standard
placed a tremendous premium on one spouse demeaning the other in the
courtroom, particularly fathers demeaning mothers. Custody trials were
thus relatively rare because most of the time the outcome was preor-
dained; few fathers wanted to invest the financial and emotional
resources to contest in what was likely to be a losing battle. When trials
occurred, however, they were intense acts of adversarial battle involving
counter accusations of unfitness that would have qualified as grounds
for divorce under the repealed fault regime.
The social and constitutional revolution against gender discrimina-
tion that began in the 1970s, however, also began to draw the sole
custody system into question. 9 As mentioned earlier, divorce became
a predictable event in the life cycle of American families, and the social
stigma associated with it began to decrease. The entry of women into
the workplace in massive numbers undercut the tender years doctrine's
economic underpinnings, as many mothers were no longer willing or
available to stay home with the children. Fathers began to perceive they
had a chance to win a custody dispute and began to assert "rights" to the
custody of their children in larger numbers. Most states eliminated the
tender years doctrine in name if not necessarily in operation. The courts
were faced with more disputes to resolve at the same time they lost their
lodestone doctrine that provided certainty in decision-making and
reduced the number of cases.
Into the breach rode mental health experts who sought to fill the
gap in the sole custody system created by the demise of the tender years
doctrine with gender neutral standards based on their expertise in
assessing the child's best emotional interests. The most notable attempt
was Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's "psychological parent" test.20
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit urged courts to, above all, create emotional
stability for children caught between warring parents by making a final
and decisive determination of custody rights to one parent or the other.
In this respect their goal was the same as the fault-based/tender years
doctrine system, but their test was based on a vision of a child's mental
19. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody
After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 669-702 (1985) (historical overview of the
development of child custody standards) [hereinafter Schepard, Taking Children
Seriously].
20. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 37-38
(1973).
402 [Vol. 22
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health. Working from a psychoanalytic framework, Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit defined the task for divorce courts in resolving child custody
disputes as identifying the single parent with whom the child had
primary psychological relationships. Stability of the child's emotional
relationship with that parent was so important to Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit that they advocated granting the psychological parent the power
to preclude the other parent from even visiting with the child for fear it
would cause emotional conflict.2 No court, however, took the policy
of stability that far, although the thinking behind it on the importance of
emotional stability for the child caught in the turmoil of divorce was
enormously influential. The importance of stability for the child also
often served as a mental health surrogate for the "tender years" doctrine,
as during this period mother was still usually the child's caretaker and
many thought her the child's "psychological parent."
The "psychological parent" test appropriately focused courts on the
emotional meaning of custody decisions for the child and the impor-
tance of stability in the child's emotional life amid the turmoil of family
reorganization. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, however, formulated their
standard based largely on clinical observations of the problems of
children in foster care and first applied it to custody contests between
the foster family and the child's natural parent. Children in foster care
placed there by a natural parent are often shifted from one foster care
giver to another and do not have day-to-day relationships with their
natural parents for extended periods of time. Mental health experts are
thus rightly concerned that a foster child forms a secure emotional
attachment with at least one adult, an attachment which the legal system
should give a very high priority to protecting.
Maintaining stability of relationships with the only adult with
whom the child has emotionally bonded, however, is not the only
mental health value in the divorce setting. Identifying a single psycho-
logical parent is a quite different and more difficult (some might say
impossible) task to accomplish in divorce compared to the foster care
setting.22 The child of divorce, unlike the child in foster care, usually
has two involved parents; each can plausibly claim important emotional
attachments to the child. Generally, each parent sees the child on a daily
basis and neither has placed the child in the care and control of the
other.
21. See id. at 38.
22. See Schepard, Taking Children Seriously, supra note 19, at 710-715, for a




Setting the court's task as identification of the child's single
"psychological parent," moreover, did nothing to change the adversarial
procedure used to conduct the "best interests" inquiry in divorce related
custody cases; it simply shifted the dialogue from fault language to a
mental health framework. The custody trial remained a "winner take
all" contest, albeit one enriched with the often conflicting testimony of
mental health experts. Parents vigorously disputed which of them had
closer emotional bonds with their child while also contesting which was
more morally fit to parent. Mental health experts (particularly those
hired by one side or the other) sometimes went beyond the available
empirical data and their limited capacity to predict the future in making
conclusions about which parent should have sole custody to serve the
child's best interests."
The Phase I court was, in effect, prepared to declare one parent
more important in the life of the child in the name of creating legal and
emotional stability for the child. Both types of stability required a
judicial choice of one parent over the other. The court's determination
did not focus on maintaining a major role for the visiting parent in the
life of the child or on long term management of the conflict between the
parents so the child could maintain a relationship with both. "Stability"
required that the legal death of the marriage because of divorce resulted
also in a custody decision that came close to declaring one parent legally
23. A graphic illustration of how adversarial procedure and the sole custody
system stretched the limits of credibility of mental health experts in the 1970s is the
transcript of the custody hearing in Rose v. Rose, extensively excerpted in JUDITH AREEN,
FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 488-574 (4th ed. 1999). Partisan witnesses and
experts for each side repeat accusations of parental incompetence and infidelity and
grandparent meddling worthy of a daytime soap opera. Goldstein himself testifies on
behalf of the father, asserting the primacy of his emotional bond with the child without
interviewing any of the parties or the child. It suffices to note that the Rose parents,
their expert witnesses, and their lawyers were also in deep dispute about whether the
mother or the father was the child's "psychological parent." Mother had the closest
relationship with the child until she attempted suicide. Father-and most significantly,
the paternal grandmother-took over care of the child during the mother's recovery
period. Much ofthe transcript is devoted to attempts by each parent to bolster evidence
of the child's psychological attachment to him or her and to minimize and disparage
the child's psychological attachment to the other with the help of hired experts. None
of the mental health experts interviewed all relevant family members. The only
confident conclusion one can draw from the transcript on this point is the not surprising
one that the child had psychological attachments to both sides and their extended
families. The whole trial seems a sad exercise in futility and revenge. For a discussion
of the limits of the empirical evidence on the effects of divorce on children in making
mental health assessments in individual cases, see GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 192-93 (2d ed. 1997).
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and emotionally dead to the child. The court's role was to preside over
a family dissolution, not its reorganization. As late as 1978, in
considering whether a court should award joint custody over the
objections of one parent in a high conflict divorce case,24 the New York
Court of Appeals (its highest court) stated that "[d]ivorce dissolves the
family as well as the marriage, a reality that may not be ignored."25
B. Phase II: Joint Custody, Mediation and Parent Education
For many American children, however, the "reality that may not be
ignored" was that they needed a different approach to child custody
decision making than that provided by Phase I courts. Serious rethink-
ing of the judicial role in custody disputes began when evidence began
to accumulate showing that for the child, divorce may be the legal
dissolution of a marriage, but is certainly not the dissolution of the
importance of parent-child or parent-parent relationships. Research
suggested that divorce was not, as had been optimistically assumed, a
benefit for most children, but potentially the beginning of a downhill
spiral with serious emotional, educational, and economic consequences.
Research also established that involved fathers played a role in child
development that was different from, but as important as, the role of
mothers. Rather than needing a stable relationship with a single
psychological parent, children generally had important emotional
relationships with both parents before divorce and benefitted if such
relationships continued after divorce.26
These research findings strengthened the resolve of fathers to seek
custody, particularly after the demise of the tender years doctrine.
24. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 1978) (resulting from a
custody modification brought by father two years after a separation agreement was
entered into giving mother custody; mother accused father of gambling and physical
abusiveness while father accused mother of sexual promiscuity; after award of joint
custody in lower court father denied mother visitation in violation of court orders;
mother disappeared for a period of time).
25. See id. at 1022.
26. A major landmark in the evolution of thinking about the effects of divorce on
children was the publication of the first longitudinal study of fifty families experiencing
divorce in Marin County, California. See generally JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN
BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH
DIVORCE (1980). Other social science researchers also made major contributions to our
understanding of the problem. See Schepard, Taking Children Seriously, supra note 19,
at 703-08, for a summary of the empirical literature through the middle of the 1980s.




Popular culture began to reinforce the notion that fathers could be
nurturing parents and should assert custody rights.2' These forces and
the influx of cases that resulted caused a substantive and procedural
transformation of the child custody dispute resolution process from fault
finding and adversarial procedure to cooperative parenting and
alternative dispute resolution.
Beginning in the late 1970s, many courts authorized joint custody
using their common law powers. Additionally, the number of states
authorizing joint custody by statute increased enormously, from three
in 1978 to an overwhelming majority today. 2' The change in substantive
legal doctrine was what two commentators have called a "small
revolution .. .in child custody law"-enactment of joint custody or
"friendly parent"'29 provisions of various levels of operational effect.
The statutes vary in strength from making joint custody following
divorce a presumption, a preference, or simply a possibility for parents
who do not agree to their own parenting plans.3" Whatever their
strength, however, all joint custody statutes constitute a radical break
27. The defining event in popular culture legitimizing fathers' claims to custody
was the enormously popular Academy Award winning movie, KRAMER VS. KRAMER
(Columbia 1979). Ironically, the movie relied on the discredited "tender years"
doctrine to create dramatic tension; mother (played by Meryl Streep), who had
abandoned her child and agreed to sole custody for the father (played by Dustin
Hoffman), actually had a weak case for modification of the initial agreement. She was
awarded sole custody after trial on the basis of the tender years doctrine which had
been declared unconstitutional by New York courts several years before. Moreover,
the film was woefully inaccurate in its depiction of the adversarial process in child
custody cases-the child was, for example, never interviewed by a mental health
expert. The parents in the end chose to voluntarily establish a custody arrangement
rather than adhere to the one favoring the mother that had been ordered by the court,
perhaps foreshadowing the judicial system's increasing emphasis on parental rather
than judicial decision making in child custody disputes. See David Ray Papke, Peace
Between the Sexes: Law and Gender in Kramer vs. Kramer, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 1199
(1996).
28. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 673.
29. Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
455, 456 (1984).
30. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 673 (citing Doris Freed & Henry Foster,
Family Law in the 50 States, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 467 (1989)). By 1989, 34 states had joint
custody statutes of one sort or another. See ELLMAN ETAL., supra note 3, at 673. See also
ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 673-75, for various state statutes which describe
different state policies towards joint custody. The authors ofthis well respected family
law case book conclude their survey of state statutes on joint custody as follows:
"[s]ome [states] simply allow joint custody; others require it to be
considered[;] ... whether special findings are required if joint custody is (or is not)
ordered, and the extend to which the details ofajoint custody arrangement are left up
to the parents themselves." Id. at 675.
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with the sole custody system. All elevate the child's maintaining
relationships with both parents after divorce to an important goal of
public policy, one often in conflict with the "stability" that was the goal
of the Phase I fault finding court.
The joint custody revolution also required a rethinking of the
procedural role of the custody courts. That role had to be broader than
simply declaring the marriage dead and distributing the assets with a
final order. A core insight of modem developmental psychology is that
children have different needs and different relationships with their
parents at different stages of their emotional maturation. Parental
conflict after divorce also ebbs and flows over time. To serve the
child's best interest in maintaining relationships with both parents after
divorce, courts had to help parents manage the different stages of their
conflict and development. They had to recognize, in effect, that for
parents and children divorce is a process of adjustment, not a single
event encapsulated in a court order. The New Jersey Supreme Court
encapsulated this philosophy when it specifically rejected the notion of
the New York Court of Appeals that "divorce dissolves the family as
well as the marriage. Both the legislation and the case law of this state
are designed to encourage parent-child interaction following divorce.
This policy is based on the best interests of the child and not on any
notion of parental rights."3'
From the early 1980s on, the critical question forjudicial adminis-
tration became how courts could implement the policy of encouraging
continued contact with both parents. Fortunately, the philosophy and
procedure ofjudicial dispute resolution began to shift at about the same
time as the movement to encourage relationships with both parents after
divorce gathered steam. Courts became more and more interested in
"alternative" methods of dispute resolution such as mediation and
arbitration, "a reference to the use of these processes in place of
litigation."32 The landmark national event in the increased judicial
consciousness of ADR was the 1976 Pound Conference sponsored by
the American Bar Association at which leading judges and lawyers
expressed deep concern about expense and delay in the justice system
in all cases. Professor Frank Sander, Reporter for the Pound Confer-
ence's follow-up task force, projected a powerful vision of the court as
not simply "a courthouse but a dispute resolution center where the
31. Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 66 n.3 (N.J. 1981).
32. STEPHEN GOLDBERG ETAL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 7 (3d ed. 1999).
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greivant, with the aid of a screening clerk, would be directed to the
process (or sequence of processes) most appropriate to a particular type
of case."33 ADR processes-particularly mediation-were thought to
be better for litigants with who had to have continuing relationships
after the trial was over, as it emphasized their common interests rather
than what divided them.
Custody cases were an obvious category of disputes that required
not just a "courthouse, but a dispute resolution center." Children in
general needed continuing relationships with both parents; parents, in
turn, needed a procedural forum to work out their disagreements for the
benefit of the child rather a courtroom for adversarial combat which
further alienated them from each other.3 4 The substantive law move-
ment toward post-divorce cooperative parenting found its procedural
partner in the ADR movement. California mandated mediation of child
custody disputes in 1980, the event which most clearly marks the
beginning of Phase II in the evolution of the judicial role.35 Many states
followed California's lead. A 1995 count by the National Center for
State Courts estimated that 200 court-connected programs existed in 38
states, with 33 states having court rules or statutes mandating mediation
in child custody disputes.36
Despite opposition and natural problems of growth and develop-
ment,37 mediation has proved itself generally well suited for the
33. See id. (citing Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111
(1976)).
34. See Schepard, Taking Children Seriously, supra note 19, at 756-59, for a 1986
discussion of the benefits of mediation in child custody disputes.
35. See Susan C. Kuhn, Comment, Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code
Section 4607, 33 EMORY L.J. 733 (1984). The mandatory mediation statute was
originally enacted as part of the California Civil Code. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607
(West 1983). Today, it is part of the California Family Code. See CAL. FAm. CODE §
3170-3171 (West Supp. 1999).
36. See Peter Salem & Ann L. Milne, Making Mediation Work in a Domestic Violence
Case, 17 FAm. AD. 34, 34 (1995).
37. Some suggested, for example, that mediation is not in the best interests of
women because they have fewer resources and are more likely to make compromises
for the sake of their children than men and thus are easy targets for unscrupulous
manipulation. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role
in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177 (1994). There are case histories to support such
concern (as there are case histories of women being traumatized by courts and
unscrupulous lawyers) but little systematic empirical evidence that women fare worse
in mediation than litigation or negotiations in the adversarial system. In most studies,
men and women express approximately equal satisfaction with mediation as a dispute
resolution process. Furthermore, women report that mediation is helpful to them in
"standing up" to their spouses, and rated themselves more capable and knowledgeable
as a result of participation in mediation. See Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce
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emerging role of dispute resolution forum of choice for encouraging a
child's relationship with both parents following divorce.3" It is
confidential, so parents' negative statements about each other do not
reach the public forum of a court and their families, friends, and
neighbors. Mediation offers parents the possibility of self-determina-
tion, the ability to voluntarily formulate their own post divorce
parenting plan rather than have a court impose one on them. Many
states offer it at low or no cost to parents, saving both the parents' and
the courts' resources.39 "In California, about 20-30% of the total
population of separating families file in court to resolve their disputes
over the care and custody of their children and are mandated to use
mediation. [M]ediation attains full resolution in one-half, and partial
resolution in two- thirds, of all custody and access disputes that enter
into court."40 In addition to resolving disputes, mediation generally
results in greater consumer satisfaction, less expense and better parent-
child and parent-parent relationships compared to adversary litigation.
Consumer satisfaction with custody mediation is not a surprising
finding, given parents' highly negative views of their experiences in
family courts. Parents often feel that after the litigation process starts,
it quickly caroms out of control. Decisions are made for them-by
lawyers and judges and custody evaluators-rather than by them.
A national commission recently reported survey results in which
50-70% of parents characterized the legal system to be "impersonal,
intimidating, and intrusive."' A recent empirical study of a sample of
Mediation Research, 34 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 373, 377-78 (1996) (describing
numerous studies); Carol J. King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce
Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375, 441 (1999) (summarizing the results
of a survey of mediation participants in two Ohio judicial districts by reporting that
"[t]he data [from the study] does not support the fears that women feel disadvantaged
in mediation").
38. See Andrew Schepard, Supporting Parent-Clients in Mediation of Child Custody
Disputes, 10 PRAC. LITIGATOR 7 (1999).
39. Problems in the delivery of mediation services to the large population of
divorcing and separating parents continue to exist. One major problem, of course, is
how to fund mediation services in an era of tight judicial budgets. For a discussion of
the available alternatives, see King, supra note 37. Another problem is the creation of
generally recognized standards of practice and professionalism for mediators, a task in
which the family mediation community is currently engaged. See Draft Model Standards
of Practice for Divorce and Family Mediators, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 106
(2000).
40. Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships with the
Court on Behalf of High Conflict Divorcing Families and Their Children: Who Needs What
Kind of Help?, 22 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REV 451 (2000).
41. UNITED STATES COMMISsION ON CHILD AND FAMILY WELFARE, PARENTING OUR
CHILDREN: IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
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divorcing parents and their children about their attitudes toward their
lawyers confirmed these findings. It reported "an overall consensus that
the attorneys' roles and responsibilities in the divorce process are not
translating into actual practice. The parents and children did not feel
they had adequate representation through guidance, information,
attention or quality of service. 4 2 Parents in the survey felt the process
was too long and never finalized, too costly, inefficient, taking control
of their lives.43 "Many of the parents did recognize that they were
already feeling angry and hostile, but 71 percent of them maintained the
legal process pushed those feelings to a further extreme."44 Higher
number of ethics complaints seem to be filed against divorce lawyers
than lawyers in other fields of practice,45 another rough reflection of
public dissatisfaction with the adversary process. The Oregon Task
Force on Family Law, a legislatively authorized interdisciplinary reform
group," summed up public dissatisfaction after extensive public
hearings on that state's divorce system:
The divorce process in Oregon, as elsewhere, was broken and
needed fixing. Lawyers, mediators, judges, counselors and citizens
in Oregon agreed that the family court system was too confrontational
to meet the human needs of most families undergoing divorce. The
process was adversarial where it needn't have been: All cases were
prepared as if going to court, when only a small percentage actually
did. The judicial system made the parties adversaries, although they
had many common interests.
The Task Force found that the sheer volume of cases was
causing the family court system to collapse. Too often, children were
treated like property while parents clogged the courts with bitter
fights over money, assets and support. The combative atmosphere
CONGREss 38-39 (1996).
42. Pruett & Jackson, supra note 8, at 306.
43. See Pruett & Jackson, supra note 8, at 299-300.
44. Pruett & Jackson, supra note 8, at 298.
45. See Stephen Labaton, Are Divorce Lawyers Really the Sleaziest?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 1993, § 4 (Week in Review) at 5.
46. Working in tandem with the Future of the Courts Committee, the Oregon
Legislature established the bipartisan interdisciplinary Task Force on Family Law
which can well serve as a model for other states considering divorce and custody
reform. See William Howe III & Maureen McNight, Oregon Task Force on Family Law:
A New System to Resolve Family Law Conflicts, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 173
(1995). See also Schepard, Conflict Prevention Programs, supra note 6, at 124-26, for a
description of the Task Force and its work in rethinking the adversarial system of
divorce.
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made it more difficult for divorcing couples to reach a settlement and
develop a cooperative relationship once the divorce was final.47
Mediation looks very good in contrast to the adversarial litigation
system. Studies report that mediation parents reach resolution of their
disputes more quickly than litigation parents, taking less than half the
time and less cost to produce a parenting plan.4 Even mediation parents
who fail to reach agreement are more likely to settle prior to trial than
litigation parents. Mediated agreements also tend to be more specific
and detailed than those negotiated by attorneys alone.49 Studies also
report that mediated agreements yesult in higher rates of children's
contact with both parents following divorce and higher rates of
compliance with parenting plans and child support agreements com-
pared to agreements reached by negotiations in the shadow of the
adversarial process."
Beginning in the early 1990s, educational programs joined
mediation as an important service that courts made available to
parents.5 Virtually no court-affiliated educational programs for parents
existed in 1960. Today, court-affiliated education is part of the child
custody dispute resolution process in most states, as revolutionary a
development as no fault divorce,joint custody, and mandated mediation.
A recent survey computed a 180% increase in such programs between
1994 and 1998.52 Forty-five states as of this writing have enacted
legislation or court rules authorizing courts to require parents to attend
such programs. 3
The rapid grass roots development of court-affiliated educational
programs for divorcing families indicates an emerging national
consensus that family courts should have a strategy that encourages
parents to reduce and manage their conflicts, not just serve as a forum
for litigating about them. 4 Court-affiliated programs typically educate
47. OREGON TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW, FINAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR JOHN A.
KITZHABER AND THE OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 2 (1997).
48. See Kelly, supra note 37, at 376-77.
49. See Kelly, supra note 37, at 373 (short summary of research results with
citations).
50. See Peter A. Dillon & Robert E. Emery, Divorce Mediation and Resolution of
Child Custody Disputes: Long Term Effects, 66 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 131, 132-33
(1996).
51. See generally Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E., supra note 2; Schepard, Conflict
Prevention Programs, supra note 6.
52. See Margie J. Geasler & Karen R. Blaisure, 1998 Nationwide Survey of Court-
Connected Divorce Education Programs, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 36 (1999).
53. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
54. See Schepard, Conflict Prevention Programs, supra note 6, at 124.
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parents about the legal process of divorce and separation, the impact of
divorce on the adults involved and, most important, the impact of
divorce on their children and how parents can make the transitions
easier for them." Parents and judges have been quite enthusiastic about
educational programs, and there is some preliminary evidence that
parental attitudes and behavior improve as a result of attendance.56
Phase II of the transformation of the court's role in divorce related
custody disputes accomplished a great deal. During Phase II, divorce
became a predictable event in the life cycle of American children and
lost its social stigma. Courts broke the stranglehold the sole custody
system and adversary procedure had on judicial thinking about chil-
dren's best interests and the nature of dispute resolution in custody
disputes that was inconsistent with the nature and incidence of family
reorganization in modem American life. Judicial policy makers
appropriately constructed a dispute resolution system on the premise
that the problems for children did not result from their parents' divorce
per se, but came about because parents put their children in the middle
of their continuing conflict. The Phase II managerial court embraced the
substantive and procedural changes that encouraged continuing
relationships between both parents and their children and helped parents
manage their conflict responsibly.
III. PHASE III: DIFFERENTIATEDCASE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH CONFLICT
DIVORCE
A. The Scope and Dimensions of the Problem
The next phase of development for the child custody dispute
resolution is to recognize that all divorce-related custody disputes are
not equal and promoting parental cooperation is not appropriate public
policy in some cases. Divorce related custody disputes which involve
the interrelated problems of violence, drug and alcohol abuse, mental
illness, and repetitive conflicts pose a greater threat to children and
parents involved than cases where those factors are not present. Most
parents adjust to the transitions of divorce and separation after a
reasonable time; a small, but highly significant percentage, however, do
not. For them and their children, the reorientation of divorce is a never-
55. See Geasler & Blaisure, supra note 52, at 51.
56. See Schepard, Conflict Prevention Programs, supra note 6, at 118-21, for a
summary of research findings.
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ending crisis rather than a period of transition. These families take up
more scarce judicial resources than less conflictual divorcing families
and there is a tendency to wish they would simply go away. They
won't, and the children who are damaged by the parents' behavior need
judicial intervention, special treatment, and targeted programs. Courts
must thus create a plan (many have already) for Differentiated Case
Management (DCM) of such cases. DCM starts from the:
premise that cases are not all alike and the amount and type of court
intervention will vary from case to case. Under this model ... a case
is assessed at its filing stage for its level of complexity and manage-
ment needs and placed on an appropriate "track." Firm deadlines and
time frames are established according to the case classification."
Creating a DCM plan is difficult because there is a great deal we do
not know about high conflict divorce involving children. Indeed, there
is as yet no consensus about what constitutes a high conflict divorce,
with some believing it should include families who experience domestic
violence, while others believe it should be limited to those involved in
repetitive litigation.58 Moreover, while some empirical data exists that
can help shape DCM plans for high conflict custody cases, much more
research is required for confident conclusions. Opinions are plentiful,
but hard data is not. A recent comprehensive study on high conflict
divorce cases by the Canadian Parliament, for example, bemoans the
absence of data for policymakers and asks for an immediate program of
empirical research on indicia of high conflict divorce including, false
allegations of abuse and neglect; parental alienation; the behaviors,
patterns, and dynamics of domestic violence and parental child
abduction. Longer term, the Canadian Parliament's study requests a
research program on: the impact ofcontinued contact with grandparents
and on losing contact with a parent; the long term well-being of children
after parenting arrangements are made; and the impact on the child of
an amicable settlement between parents.5 9 The need for empirical
research is so pressing that our own federal government might consider
creating a national institute to insure both the funding for and quality of
the research needed and its wide dissemination.
We also cannot pinpoint the exact number of highly conflicted
divorce related custody cases defined in terms of "repetitive letigation."
Research suggests that a relatively small number of parents continue in
57. Kaye & Lippman, supra note 13, at 163.
58. See CANADIAN PARLIAMENT CUSTODY REPORT, supra note 3, at 73.
59. See CANADIAN PARLIAMENT CUSTODY REPORT, supra note 3, at 78.
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very high conflict over family reorganization for a number of years.6"
Constance Ahrons found such parents (whom she labeled "Angry
Associates") to be 25 % of her small sample of the divorcing popula-
tion.6 Janet Johnston and Vivian Roseby estimate that "about one-
fourth of all divorcing couples with children have considerable difficulty
completing the legal divorce without extensive litigation" and about
one-fifth of families relitigate custody issues after divorce.62 A recent
empirical study of five court systems found that 16% of divorcing
families who had children had been to court for another family-related
matter during the previous five years.63 Other estimates are 5%- 10% of
the total population of divorcing and separating parents.
64
While they are a minority of divorces involving parents, these high
conflict cases pose serious risks to children and require a significant
amount of attention from the court system. By anyone's definition, for
example, a child custody dispute involving allegations of child abuse
and neglect by one parent or the other qualifies as "high conflict." The
child custody and child protection systems intersect in such cases and
they thus require a carefully thought out DCM plan.
A recent study of such cases in the Australian Family Court sheds
some light on both the prevalence and on the intractable nature of these
highly conflicted families. 65 The Australian research team carefully
60. See Michael E. Lamb et al., The Effects of Divorce and Custody Arrangements on
Children's Behavior, Development, andAdjustment, 35 FAM. &CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 393,
396 (1997) (consensus statement by experts in psychology, law, and social welfare
convened under the auspices of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development).
61. See CONSTANCE AHRONS, THE GOOD DIVORCE 56 (1994).
62. JANET R. JOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN OF CONFLICTED AND
VIOLENT DIVORCE 4 (1997).
63. See H. Ted Rubin, The Nature of the Court Today, in 6 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN:
THE JUVENILE COURT 43 (Center for the Future of Children of the Packard Foundation
ed., 1996).
64. See Lamb et al., supra note 60, at 396; see Janet R. Johnston, Developing and
Testing a Group Intervention for Families at Impasse, in CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON PARENT EDUCATION PROGRAMS 5 (Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts ed., 1997) (Executive Summary of a Forthcoming
Report to the California Judicial Conference).
65. See Thea Brown et al., Problems and Solutions in the Management of Child Abuse
Allegations in Custody and Access Disputes in the Family Court, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 431 (1998). The researchers are academic and practicing social workers who
participate in the Australian Family Courts' Family Violence and Family Court
Research Program. The description of their study in text which follows is drawn from
the article cited in this footnote. To avoid repetitive citations to this article, page
citations will be provided only for direct quotations from the article.
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tracked allegations of child abuse of all kinds-physical, sexual, and
neglect-in a sample of 200 custody and visitation cases in Canberra,
Australia's national capital and a small city, and in Melbourne, Austra-
lia's second largest city. While custody and access disputes with child
abuse allegations were only a small percentage of total family related
court filings, the researchers found they were particularly troublesome
subjects for judicial management. Such cases have what might be
called "staying power" on the court docket--"the child abuse cases
stayed in the court; they did not drop out [settle] or become resolved as
frequently as other custody and access cases."66 Thus, though small in
number, custody and visitation disputes involving child abuse allega-
tions took an especially large amount of the time and effort of judges
and court personnel.
The Australian researchers also found that the families involved in
child custody disputes with child abuse allegations shared some of the
same socioeconomic characteristics of others families in their geo-
graphic areas, including race and ethnicity. But the abuse allegation
families also had different characteristics indicating that serious social
problems were associated with their dispute-their unemployment rates
were higher, and they had higher rates of criminal convictions,
substance abuse, and partner to partner violence. Many of them were
known to child protective services before the custody dispute was filed.
The Australian researchers also tested a perception widely shared
by judges and lawyers everywhere in emotionally laden custody and
access disputes with child abuse allegations. Many professionals
involved in such cases believe that the allegations are presumptively
false, simply a nuclear weapon in the ongoing divorce and custody wars.
The Australian data did not, however, support that perception. The
researchers studied a subset of thirty cases and found the same rate of
false allegations as those reported to the Australian child protective
services in traditional child abuse and neglect cases--only 9%. They
also noted that a different study of fifty custody and access cases the
previous year came to the same conclusion.
The Australian data suggests that all allegations of child maltreat-
ment and endangerment in a divorce related custody proceeding should
be taken seriously. Courts need to consider a full range of alternative
explanations for the allegations, but needs to pursue them thoroughly
and carefully.6 7 Many (not all) of them will turn out to be true and
66. See id. at 433.
67. See Kathleen Coulborn Faller, Child Maltreatment and Endangerment in the
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therapeutic and legal intervention is required to protect the children. To
minimize the number of false claims of this very serious charge, serious
penalties should be imposed for a parent's making intentionally false
allegations of abuse and neglect in a divorce related custody case.68
Domestic violence can also be a symptom of a high conflict
custody case. We do know something about its prevalence and its
effects on children. Domestic violence directed toward women is one
of the most frequently reported crimes in the United States; estimates
report that a beating takes place every 18 seconds.69 While the exact
number is uncertain because of differing definitions of domestic
violence, about two million women every year are seriously physically
abused by their partners.7" A smaller-but significant-number of men
suffer abuse each year at the hands of their female partners.7 We do not
know, however, how many victims of domestic violence seek the help
of the legal system through divorce and custody proceedings.
The effects of domestic violence on children are becoming
increasingly well-documented. The available research shows a
significant connection between partner and child abuse and maltreat-
ment, though estimates of the exact correlation vary widely.72 In
addition, there is strong data that suggests children are powerfully
affected by being exposed to violence even if they are themselves not
actual victims. A review of recent research on the subject concludes:
Context of Divorce, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 427 (2000).
68. See CANADIAN PARLIAMENT CUSTODY REPORT, supra note 3, at 85-91
(recommending assessment of the adequacy of the Criminal Code to deal with
intentional false allegations of abuse or neglect in custody disputes).
69. See Katherine M. Reihing, Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence and Their
Children After Divorce: The American Law Institute's Model, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.
REV. 393, 393 (1999).
70. See id.
71. Janet Johnston and Linda Campbell found men to be the victims of female-
initiated violence in 10-15% of their sample of 140 domestic violence cases. See Janet
R. Johnston & Linda E. G. Campbell, Parent-Child Relationships in Domestic Violence
Families Disputing Custody, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 282, 288-89 (1993).
Canadian data shows that in 1996 11 % of the victims of domestic violence were male,
while 89% were female. CANADIAN PARLIAMENT CUSTODY REPORT, supra note 3, at 79.
Recent survey data suggest that women now account for a quarter to a third of all
domestic violence arrests, up from less than 10% a decade ago. See Carey Goldberg,
Spouse Abuse Crackdown, Surprisingly, Nets Many Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at
Al.
72. See Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their
Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273, 285-86
(1999); Catherine C. Ayoub et al., Emotional Distress in Children of High-Conflict Divorce:
The Impact of Marital Conflict and Violence, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297, 300
(1999).
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Children who have witnessed domestic violence present a variety of
emotional factors, sense a lack of control over their life circum-
stances, and experience feelings of hopelessness and helplessness.
Children from violent families may experience depression, anxiety,
and an increase in somatic complaints or they may externalize their
distress through aggression and delinquency."
Perhaps most significantly, children exposed to violence and high
conflict "bear an acutely heightened risk of repeating the cycle of
conflicted and abusive relationships as they grow up and try to form
families of their own. 74
Finally, of mental illness and drug and alcohol abuse complicate
judicial treatment of high conflict divorce. According to the Surgeon
General, one in five Americans experiences mental illness of varying
levels of seriousness in a given year, and half of all Americans experi-
ences such disorders during their lives.75 Divorce is a significant social
stress that can aggravate pre-existing mental illness.76 In a small number
of cases, violence against family members may result when mental
illness and divorce interact. While we cannot pinpoint the relationship
with precision, research suggests that substance abuse and mental illness
are important factors in some high conflict families, as they also seem
to have a relationship to the incidence of family violence. Drug and
alcohol use and abuse seem, for example, to be associated with
73. See Joseph C. McGill et al., Visitation and Domestic Violence: A Clinical Model
of Family Assessment and Access Planning, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 315, 320
(1999).
74. See JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 62, at 5.
75. See Robert Pear, Few Seek to Treat Mental Disorders, A U.S. Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at Al.
76. The psychiatric community recognizes the social stress that divorce creates for
people with mental illness in its classification for mental illness. The authoritative
Fourth Edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) uses a multiaxial system to describe a person's
mental functioning. "The use of the multiaxial system facilitates comprehensive and
systematic evaluation with attention to the various mental disorders and general medial
conditions, psychosocial and environmental problems, and level of functioning that
might be overlooked if the focus were on assessing a single presenting problem."
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION DSM-IV 25 (1994). Axis IV of the DSM-IV muliaxial
system is a measurement of the person's "[plsychosocial and evironmental problem."
Id. at 29. "Axis IV is for reporting psychosocial and environmental problems that may
affect the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of mental disorders." Id. at 29.
Conditions which should be noted on Axis IV include "[p]roblems with primary support
group---e.g.... disruption of family by separation, divorce or estrangement." Id.
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particularly violent forms of wife battering."' Substance abuse and
mental illness also seem to reduce the ability of some parents to care for
children."8
High conflict divorce cases thus pose numerous special challenges
to family courts. The families involved in them are deeply troubled in
a variety of interrelated ways. Their cases raise issues of immediate
physical safety of vulnerable parents and children as well as mental
health and substance abuse. High conflict cases involving violence also
present emotionally charged issues of gender politics and "an obvious
fault orientation that runs counter to a broad trend towards disregarding
marital conduct in family law."79  Repetitive litigants take judicial
resources away from other families and place their children in the
middle of a perpetual war zone. Above all, high conflict cases put
children at particular risk because of the long-lasting negative effects
exposure to prolonged parental conflict and violence can have on them.
One respected family violence research team recently stated:
those of us who assist the courts in the resolution of visitation and
custody disputes should be aware of the damage that continued
conflict could cause the children involved. As a result, encouraging
a more aggressive mandate for conflict reduction becomes one central
goal in the court process. The best-interests standard must be
informed by the cumulative negative impact of these factors and their
weight in examining emotional well-being during the process of
decision making for children of acrimonious divorce."0
B. Integrating Violence Sensitivity into Parent Education and
Mediation
Substantive legal doctrine is changing to incorporate violence
sensitivity by, for example, mandating that courts consider proven
domestic violence as a factor in making a custody determination.8 The
77. See JOHNSTON & ROSEBY, supra note 62, at 29.
78. See Ayoub et al., supra note 72, at 309-10.
79. See Nicholas Bala, Spouse Abuse and Children of Divorce: A Differentiated
Approach, 13 CAN. J. FAM. L. 215, 217 (1996).
80. Ayoub et al., supra note 72, at 311.
81. A recent law review comment states that "there are custody statutes which
address domestic violence in forty-four states and the District of Columbia." Lynne R.
Kurtz, Comment, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a
Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALBANY
L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1997).
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child custody dispute resolution multi-door courthouse created in Phase
II needs to, and is, adapting to the special problems family violence
creates. A first and important step for court systems to help the children
and parents in high conflict families is to integrate violence sensitivity
into existing court-affiliated parent education and mediation programs.
Indeed, mediation programs and parent education programs are
beginning to adopt their theories and techniques to recognize the need
for differential treatment of high conflict and violent families.82
For too long, the domestic violence community and the mediation
and parent education community viewed each other as adversaries. In
gross terms, the domestic violence community viewed the mediation
and parent education community as promoting parental cooperation
without adequate understanding of the incidence and role of domestic
violence in divorce and custody disputes and without adequate screening
and safeguards for domestic violence victims in their programs. The
mediation and parent education community, on the other hand,
sometimes viewed the domestic violence community as not recognizing
the steps that were taken to protect violence and as not recognizing the
child's need for relationships with both parents in some cases where
violence occurred.
Part of the problem may be that while both groups use the term
"domestic violence" they may be talking about different social phenom-
ena.83  As the model interdisciplinary team of psychologist Geri
Fuhrmann, social worker Joseph McGill, and law professor Mary
O'Connell recently suggested, the mediation and parent education
community think of domestic violence more as "'conflict-instigated
violence' ... physical violence used as a tool of conflict resolution."84
The domestic violence community is built around a very different kind
of domestic violence--"control instigated" a largely male phenomena
where the aggressor's goal is to dominate the partner and the violence
is part of a larger and planned pattern of domination.85 Conflict
instigated violence is certainly not admirable and has serious negative
consequences for children and parents. It may not, however, be as
82. See Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody in the Face ofDomestic
Violence: Suggestionsfor Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 335,
340 (1999).
83. Compare Dalton, supra note 72, with Janet R. Johnston, Response to Clare
Dalton's "When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children in the
Family Court System," 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 422 (1999).
84. See Geri S. W. Fuhrmann et al., Parent Education's Second Generation:




dangerous for both parents to have a continuing relationship with the
children requiring parental contact as when control instigated violence
is the problem. Perpetrators of conflict instigated violence may be able
to learn to resolve conflict more peacefully than those who use violence
as part of a pattern of control. Control instigated violence seems far
more based in deeply rooted character and personality traits that are far
less amenable to positive intervention. As Janet Johnston, one of the
nation's leading clinicians and researchers in high-conflict divorcing
families observed: "All violence is unacceptable.., however ... not
all violence is the same ...domestic violence families need to be
considered on an individual basis when helping them to develop post
divorce parenting plans." '86
There is no more important need than for a serious discussion
between domestic violence advocates and the mediation and parent
education community about when and how it is appropriate for children
in violent families to maintain a relationship with both parents after
divorce and separation. This dialogue may require reevaluation of
previously held positions on all sides.
The parent education and mediation community has to recognize
that physical safety has to override the need for a child to have a
relationship with both parents after divorce if there are serious concerns
about child abuse, domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental
illness. There is evidence that mediation and parent education programs
are in the process of incorporating violence sensitive perspectives into
their operations. To cite two examples: Court-affiliated parent
education programs are beginning to recognize the need to integrate
understanding of family violence into their programs and to modify their
message from "parents should cooperate for the benefit of the children"
to "parents should cooperate if it is safe for parents and children to do
so."'87 The mediation community is in the process of revising its
standards of practice to implement the general principle that "[w]hile
[mediators] are neutral about the particular agreement reached (provided
it is reached voluntarily), [mediators] are not neutral about the safety of
our clients and their children."88 The Draft Standards of Practice require
that mediators be trained to recognize and screen for domestic violence
86. Bala, supra note 79, at 217 (quoting Janet Johnston, Domestic Violence and
Parent-Child Relationships in Families Disputing Custody, 9 AUST. J. FAM. L. 12, 25
(1995)).
87. See Geri Fuhrmann et al., supra note 84, at 32.
88. This principle was articulated by a group of prominent Canadian mediators at
a Toronto forum and is reported in Bala, supra note 79, at 282.
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before and during the mediation process. 9 They also require mediators
to take steps to structure the mediation process to insure physical safety
for victims and children." Finally, they suspend the mediator's general'
obligation of confidentiality when child abuse is disclosed or one parent
credibly threatens the physical safety of another during mediation
sessions.9'
For its part, the domestic violence community may need to
recognize that some victims of violence involved in custody disputes
may benefit from parent education and mediation. Some. victims of
domestic violence may need the information and perspective that
appropriately designed parent education programs can provide them.
Not all violent partners are necessarily conniving batterers who use
physical aggression as part of an overall plan for total intimidation and
control of the victim. Some victims of domestic violence may have
recovered their self-confidence enough to be a suitable mediation
participant if advised by counsel and protected by appropriate safe-
guards in the mediation process. Certainly, some domestic violence
victims want to mediate their post-divorce parenting relationships with
their partner. They report as much, if not more, satisfaction with the
mediation process as do women who do not experience domestic
abuse.92 Recent empirical studies of custody mediation in Ohio and
Maine report higher levels of participation and satisfaction by victims
89. See Draft Model Standards of Practice for Divorce and Family Mediators Standard
XIA.-E., 38 FAM. &CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 110, 120 (2000). The Standard of Practice
is that "A family mediator should recognize a family situation involving domestic
violence and take appropriate steps to shape the mediation process accordingly." Id.
Subparts to the Standard provide specific guidelines to the family mediator about how
to achieve the goal set forth in the Standard.
90. See Draft Model Standards of Practice for Divorce and Family Mediators Standard
XI D.-E., 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 110, 120 (2000) (specifying various
measures that the mediator should take to insure safety for victims of domestic violence
and their children, including holding separate sessions with the parties, encouraging
representation of the victim by an advocate at the sessions and specifically requiring
the mediator ensure that victims ofdomestic violence consider whether parenting plans
resulting from mediation "protect the physical safety and psychological well-being of
themselves and their children").
91. See Draft Model Standards of Practice for Divorce and Family Mediators Standard
VIII E, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 110, 120 (2000) (requiring the mediator to
disclose "a party's threat of violence against another party likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm to the threatened party and the appropriate
authorities").
92. See King, supra note 37, at 444-46; see Roselle Wissler, Family Law Mediation:




of domestic violence in mediation as compared to attorney-negotiated
settlements.93
More women [who are victims of domestic violence] reported feeling
pressure to settle outside mediation than in mediation .... Clearly,
not all women feel a need to cut off all contact with [an abusive]
former spouse. Adherence to such assumptions places all abused
women into a single group and ignores evidence suggesting there is
much variability among abused women as a class.' 4
C. A Plan for Differential Case Management
Integration of violence sensitivity into existing court-affiliated
programs for managing parental conflict is an important part in the
creation of a comprehensive plan for DCM for high conflict custody
cases involving children.95 Such a plan must create criteria to identify
high conflict parents early in their dispute for special treatment.' Only
an effective screening program can provide high conflict families with
special treatment without overly burdening the reasonably cooperative
majority of divorcing parents whose children do not need extensive state
intervention for their protection.97 The DCM plan must also provide
93. See King, supra note 37, at 446.
94. King, supra note 37, at 446.
95. Idaho has developed a sophisticated DCM for children of high conflict divorce
very similar to that described in this article. See generally Hildy Mauzerall et al.,
Protecting the Children of High Conflict Divorce: An Analysis of the Idaho Bench/Bar
Committee to Protect Children of High Conflict Divorce's Report to the Idaho Supreme Court,
33 IDAHo L. REv. 291 (1997).
96. See Brown et al., supra note 65, at 440-41, for a DCM plan for custody cases
involving allegations of child abuse.
97. The need for sophisticated judicial planning to serve these multiple goals was
recently emphasized by a Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access of the
Canadian Parliament which conducted a comprehensive study of Canada's child
custody dispute resolution system. The Committee's recommendations on high conflict
divorce recognize the fundamental problem: "the desire . . . to improve the legal
system's response to high-conflict divorces, without imposing any harmful restrictions
on the co-operative majority." The Special Committee strongly recommended creation
of:
a mechanism for screening out high-conflict divorces and treating them in
a different stream. This would recognize the potential harm to children
whose parents continue their conflict far beyond a reasonable adjustment
period. The system should identify these families in order to provide
protection for their children, who are at greater risk than most children of
divorce. Once families are identified, their files should be "red tagged" or
flagged in some other way, so that decision makers do not make
determinations about parenting arrangements without knowing the full
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high conflict families with services that show promise of helping their
children while protecting their legal rights.
Developing a comprehensive plan for a differential child custody
dispute resolution process is a daunting task, given the scant research
and experience to draw on. It requires experimentation, interdisciplin-
ary dialogue, and much more space than can be given in this article. It
may be helpful, however, to begin to sketch what such a system might
look like and extend an invitation to the courts, lawyers, the mental
health community and all those concerned with children to draw on their
experience and comment and improve upon it.
Imagine a hypothetical high conflict family (by anybody's
definition) ....
D. The Nelson Family
Harriet Nelson is a dentist and Ozzie a police captain. They have
been married for 19 years. They have two children: David, a boy, 10,
and Ricki, a girl, 8. Tension in the house is palpable since Ozzie
discovered Harriet is having an affair with a former mutual friend. The
affair began after Ozzie's harsh and repeated criticism of Harriet for
excessive drinking and abusing prescription drugs. The two have had
a few violent incidents which arise out of disagreements between them.
The violence is sometimes initiated by Ozzie, sometimes by Harriet.
Ozzie always eventually prevails by physically dominating Harriet but
without inflicting any permanent physical injury on her. Ozzie also
never threatens Harriet with violence, never tries to control her finances,
her relationships with friends, etc. The last violent episode was a year
prior to the date the divorce complaint was filed. David and Rikki have
witnessed some of the parental violence. Ozzie hit David when David
tried to break up a fight between his parents. He is deeply remorseful
about what has occurred. Harriet, in contrast, states that the family
problems all result from Ozzie's behavior, not hers. Both children
express a great love for both parents. Rikki is withdrawn, depressed and
has spoken of suicide, problems piled on top of a learning disability.
David is very protective of his mother while Rikki is not obviously
aligned with either parent. Mutual orders of protection are outstanding
against both Ozzie and Harriet. Harriet files for divorce from Ozzie and
seeks sole custody of the children. Her expressed motivation is a desire
details of the case and the families history.
CANADIAN PARLIAMENT CUSTODY REPORT, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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to marry her lover. Ozzie is adamant he will not loose his children to
Harriet.
What principles should determine how the legal system processes
the Nelson's dispute?
1. Unified Treatment
The Nelson family's dispute resolution process should, if at all
possible, be determined by a single judge, aided by a single social
services team, all of whom have full information about the previous
court proceedings.98 The same judge who decides who should have
temporary custody of David and Rikki should also decide: whether
orders of protection are made permanent; if Ozzie or Harriet should
move out; whether supervised visitation is necessary; whether mediation
and parent education are appropriate; whether a lawyer or guardian ad
litem should be appointed for the children; if Rikki needs hospitalization
(if Ozzie and Harriet don't agree); if Ozzie or Harriet might be referred
to anger management classes, interim support payments; and the
schedule for the families' forensic evaluations. Otherwise, the Nelsons
will suffer what Professor Catherine Ross has labeled "the failure of
fragmentation"--different judges, each with a piece of jurisdiction
over the Nelsons, issuing conflicting orders, conflicting schedules for
court-related events, and multiple court appearances without any benefit
to David and Rikki.
The court and support staff must take also charge of managing the
high conflict custody case and put it on an expedited, rational track
toward resolution. Chaotic, potentially violent parents need to be under
intense supervision by an authority figure who puts the interests of their
children first. Ozzie and Harriet must have the right to have access to
the court to insure their legal rights are protected and the court must
ultimately be responsible for the quality of services delivered by its
affiliated programs and professionals.
98. See Andrew Schepard, Law and Children: Introduction to Unified Family Courts,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1997, at 3 (describing history and rationale of unified family courts
movement). For a comprehensive discussion of unified family courts, see Barbara
Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A
Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 469 (1998).
99. See generally Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a
System of Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3 (1998).
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2. Early Screening and Differential Diagnosis
Early identification of high conflict families such as the Nelsons is
an essential prerequisite to DCM of their dispute. The longer the
dispute goes on without someone in authority recognizing it needs top
priority case management, the greater the chance of further violence and
deterioration of the children. If the Nelsons are recognized early as a
high conflict family, they can be ordered or referred to dispute resolu-
tion and health and social services interventions that might help them
cope with their conflict, medical problems, and stress.
Screening the Nelson family for violence, substance abuse, and the
risk of harm to self, is the single greatest need and the single greatest
problem that a DCM plan faces."° The legal system only knows of the
Nelson's dispute when a complaint or action is filed in court. This basic
fact suggests that an immediate preliminary conference with family
court support services should be required for every family whose initial
court filings indicate that custody is in dispute. A screening protocol
which can be administered in a short amount of time with reasonable
accuracy needs to be developed to identify which families need high
conflict treatment and which do not.
The screening task is particularly daunting, as it is the key to the
DCM process. Many victims of domestic violence are, for example,
reluctant to disclose experiences of domestic abuse because of fear for
their own or their children's safety or economic dependence on the
batterer. Skilled interviewers of children are also vital parts of a
screening process. In addition, agreed upon criteria for differentiating
between types of family violence are presently hard to come by. In the
hypothetical situation, for example, it seems to be that the violence
between Ozzie and Harriet is conflict rather than control instigated and
thus potentially more amenable to therapeutic interventions.°' But it
may be hard to reach that conclusion with any degree of confidence
through a manageable screening program.
Ultimately, any screening process will have to rely heavily on the
judgment of the professionals who undertake it, informed by a shared
flow of research results from long term studies and similar programs in
other states. The absence of confident guidelines for screening suggests
that the process should be undertaken by a multi disciplinary team of
mental health professionals and legally trained personnel to insure that
100. See Reihing, supra note 69, at 403-04.
101. See Part 11i.B., supra.
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different perspectives enter into it. The absence of confident guidelines
also suggests the importance of amassing experience in pilot programs
and carefully analyzing it before permanent policy judgments are made.
3. Multiple Dispute Resolution Options and Expedited Case
Management
The Nelsons will benefit if the court and its support staff have a rich
variety of dispute resolution and health and social service options to call
on to help manage their conflict and shield their children from harm.
The screening team should be responsible for developing a short and
long term case management plan for the Nelsons for approval by the
court before implementation. The plan must assure safety of all
involved, perhaps recommending that the court order one of the parents
to "move out" of the marital residence. The plan may recommend
supervised visitation, the appointment of a lawyer for the child and an
expedited forensic evaluation. Therapy for the children may be helpful,
as might an educational program for them in which they can learn about
the legal process, and what they and their parents are experiencing.
10 2
Harriet may need medical treatment for substance abuse. The Nelsons
might be required to attend an education program specially designed for
high conflict families.0 3 and, if safe, participate in mediation to develop
a parenting plan for David and Rikki. If conflict continues endlessly, a
special master may be appointed to supervise the families' transitions
during divorce and separation."' 4 As a matter of fundamental fairness,
each parent must have the right to contest any of the team's recommen-
dations at a hearing before the judge.
What is more important, however, than the specific services that the
Nelsons experience is that the process of dispute resolution and
therapeutic intervention does not drag along and that the Nelsons follow
through on what they are ordered to do. Children must feel that the state
through its court system is looking out for their interests; parents must
feel that the dispute resolution is a rational progression toward the same
end. Children have a unique sense of time; a day can seem like a month
102. See generally Trecia DiBias, Some Programs for Children, 34 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. H 2 (1996).
103. See generally Hugh Mclsaac & Charlotte Finn, Parents Beyond Conflict: A
Cognitive Restructuring Model for High-Conflict Families in Divorce, 37 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 74 (1999) (describing such a program in Multnomah County
Circuit Court in Portland, Oregon).
104. See Andrew Schepard, Law and Children: Managing Parents in High Conflict:
Special Masters in High Conflict Custody Cases, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1997 at 3.
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and a month a year depending on their developmental stage. Dispute
resolution should take place in accordance with the child's sense of
time, not the adults. In addition, the imposition and enforcement of time
deadlines will help convince the Nelsons that the court system is serious
about protecting their children and will hold them accountable for their
welfare.' 5
One way the court can achieve these goals is to appoint a case
manager to supervise the DCM plan's implementation for the Nelson
family. The case manager could be responsible for regular conferences
with the Nelsons and their lawyers to insure that deadlines are met and
to inform the court and family services if they are not. The case
manager could also be the point person for the Nelsons and their counsel
for contacting the court.
All in all, it is the court's responsibility to create a rational,
expeditious plan for resolution of the Nelson's dispute drawing on the
advice of an interdisciplinary team and on a wide variety of options
tailored for high conflict families. Each court will, of course, have to
create its own flow chart for high conflict cases that incorporates the
resources available for such families in its local community. In larger
communities services may be provided by court employees; in smaller
communities, they could be provided by qualified service providers who
do different things for different families.
The critical point is more that the family court should have a DCM
plan for high conflict families rather than what its exact content is. The
plan can change as resources develop and experience accumulates as to
which services work best for high conflict families. Funding for the
necessary services is obviously critical. It will also be hard to obtain
because many believe that high conflict families bring their troubles
upon themselves and do not deserve help from public resources."
Concerned professionals need to convince policy makers that funding
is an investment in the future of children and will savejudicial resources
in the long run.
105. See Schepard, Taking Children Seriously, supra note 19, at 773-74.
106. See Nancy Thoennes & Jessica Pearson, Supervised Visitation: A Profile of
Providers, 37 FAM. & CONCLtATION. CTS. REV. 460, 474 (1999) (describing a "public
perception that supervised visitation programs serve dysfunctional adults who are




The child custody court has been transformed in what is, for the
legal system, a comparatively short period oftime-approximately forty
years. The child custody court has moved permanently beyond the stage
where its sole function is to award sole custody to the better parent.
Today's child custody court is a conflict manager, not a fault finder.
Much progress has been made in adopting the child custody dispute
resolution system to the needs of both children and parents for continu-
ing relationships through the wide spread implementation of parenting
plans, mediation and parent education.
As Chief Judge Vanderbilt's stated, however, "judicial reform is no
sport for the short-winded or for lawyers who are afraid of temporary
defeat."'0 7 The custody dispute resolution system's collective challenge
for the next Millennium is to encourage the majority of parents who can
cooperate for the benefit of their children to do so while creating an
expedited and structured process for higher conflict families whose
children need protection through more intrusive expedited interventions.
Meeting that challenge will require costs, and a process of trial and error
and education of the bench, bar, and mental health community. The
result, however, will be a system that targets scare resources to families
that really need help and, above all, provides substance to the claim that
the court protects the best interests of the child in high conflict custody
cases.
107. See Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Introduction, in MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION XiX (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949). Vanderbilt continued: "Rather,
we must recall the sound advice given by General Jan Smuts to the students at Oxford:
'When enlisted in a good cause, never surrender, for you can never tell what morning
reinforcements in flashing armor will come marching over the hilltop."' Id.
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